125th Signal support of Operation Iniki Response

by MAJ(P) Gregg Petersen

The 125th Signal Battalion provided exceptional command and control communications support to the Joint Task Force and various disaster relief headquarters over unexpected distances with outstanding reliability. For a time it also provided the only accessible communications means to isolated hurricane victims trying to contact friends and family on Oahu.

Late on 10 September, 1992, the National Weather Service began to project that Hurricane Iniki might strike the island of Oahu. As the probability of the hurricane striking Oahu increased, the 25th Infantry Division (Light) [25ID(L)] G3, instructed LTC Jan Hicks, the 125th Signal Battalion Commander, to plan an island-wide communications network for Oahu in the event that Iniki completely devastated Oahu's communications facilities with its 160 mile-an-hour winds.

Early on 11 September, Hicks mustered the 450 soldier battalion to protect all of its home station, the Helemano Military Reservation (HMR), facilities from the effects of the storm and to plan to deploy immediately after Iniki had passed to restore Oahu communications as rapidly as possible, if necessary. At the G3's direction, the battalion rapidly deployed single channel AN/PCS-3 Tactical Satellites (TACSATs) and operators to the Hawaii Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at Fort Ruger, nestled in the Diamondhead Crater near Honolulu and to the United States Army Support Command, Hawaii EOC at Fort Shafter.

As soldiers began to tape windows in the battalion headquarters and tie down equipment in the motor pool, the battalion staff converted the battalion conference room into a makeshift Signal Battalion EOC to consolidate all updates and coordinate staff responses to the ever-increasing threat from the approaching storm.

125th Signal preparations included providing soldiers, cots, light sets, back-up generator power, and food to the HMR community storm shelter to comfort HMR family members who were evacuated from their homes. Concurrently, the battalion sent soldiers door-to-door to each of the over 600 newly-built HMR family housing units to distribute civil defense and storm safety pamphlets for the community. The soldiers also combed the entire reservation, tieing down loose objects and hauling away others to insure the community would weather the storm as safely as possible. The Battalion S3 section, led by CPT Matt Mulqueen, completed its plans for Oahu after-storm communications.

Around noon, the battalion moved to shelter in the headquarters building to wait out the expected brunt of the storm, as the winds continued to build to a peak of 60 miles per hour. Some tree limbs snapped under the strain of the wind. The wind also ripped off the corrugated roof of the "lost

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soldiers" shelter near the AAFES shopette, just outside the battalion headquarters, and smashed it to the ground some twenty feet away. The north motor pool fence, which had its lower tie-wires ripped off, was blowing out parallel to the ground as the hurricane winds began to subside. The remains of a few small wood platforms laid scattered across the battalion motor pool. Fortunately, they had not caused any serious damage to the unit vehicles when the storm had launched them across the enclosure.

Although Oahu had experienced relatively little damage, CPT Mulqueen, was instructed by the division staff to begin planning for a Kauai contingency communications network. The S3 assigned the task to 1LT Scott Scales, the Assistant S3. Initially, the job seemed only a map exercise with little potential of it becoming reality.

At 1500 on 11 September, the National Weather Service announced that Oahu had experienced the worst hurricane affects it would receive, but the island of Kauai was directly in Iniki's path and was receiving the brunt of the storm's devastating fury. One military recording device on Kauai recorded the hurricane windspeed at 227mph before the storm destroyed it. Iniki was designated a Category 4 storm, of equal or greater fury than the more publicized Hurricane Andrew. Before the storm moved on, Iniki had completely devastated the island of Kauai, destroying many homes and completely stripping it of power and communications.

ADM Charles Larson, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC) quickly appointed LTG Johnnie Corns, the United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) Commander to head Joint Task Force (JTF) Hawaii. The CINCPAC dubbed the operation Iniki Response. Corns instructed 25ID(L) Deputy Commander (Operations), BG Frank Akers, Jr. was selected to lead TF-GI. The division motto was modified from, "Ready to Fight Anytime, Anywhere!"to "Ready to assist, anytime, anywhere, to anyone in need!" for the operation.

The G3 instructed Hicks to plan and install a communications network to link all JTF command and control (C2) elements from the JTF HQ at Fort Shafter to Barking Sands on the distant coast of Kauai. The 125th Signal Battalion staff immediately began to plan for a contingency communications network linking both Oahu and the island of Kauai.

Initially, the signal battalion provided JTF C2 connectivity via single channel TACSATS. The network linked the Hawaiian National Guard at Fort Ruger, the USARPAC/JTF Command Center at Fort Shafter, and 25ID(L) EOC at Schofield Barracks with forward

125 Sig Bn 53, Matt Mulqueen discusses his MSE network from the battalion Syscon at Lihue Airport on Kauai

TF-GI elements at Lihue airport on Kauai as the TF deployed to make their initial damage assessments. Later, the battalion provided a TACSAT to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade to allow them to join the JTF command net. The signal battalion TACSAT inventory increased with the receipt of four HST-4 single channel TACSATs from Space Command (SPACECOM) in Colorado. Comms were also beefed up with the receipt of 11 INMARSAT voice terminals from SPACECOM, FORSCOM, and I Corps.

The island of Kauai lies approximately 150 kilometers to the north and west of Oahu (Figure 1). Since the mission required long-haul communications, the Signal battalion obviously needed to use its newly fielded multichannel TACSAT to connect the planned Kauai network with its Oahu counterpart. The battalion multichannel TACSAT operators had received only four days of new equipment training (NET) on their terminals, and the unit did not yet have a complete set of TACSAT equipment. However, the need for long distance communications was urgent, so Hicks decided to employ the multichannel TACSAT in the network.

The unit Communications Electronics Command (CECOM) Logistics Assistance Representatives (LARs) Wayne Raybon and Warren Bowen as well as trainers from the TRADOC System Manager (TSM) Satellite Communications (SATCOM) NET Team, from Fort Gordon, Georgia, led by SFC David McJunkin, offered hands-on technical assistance to deploy with and install the terminals if necessary. Hicks accepted their offer.

The CECOM Logistics Assistance Office (LAO) led by Bill Harvey on Oahu, further assisted by locating needed parts at Fort Monmouth for two deadlined single channel TACSATs and had them delivered by overnight mail.

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Based on CECOM's reaction, it was apparent that the rest of the Army understood the urgency of the 25ID(L) mission. MAJ Gregg Petersen, the Battalion Executive Officer, directed the Battalion S1 to order needed TACSAT and 5-ton truck operator manuals by calling St. Louis and citing the disaster relief effort as justification for a rapid fill. The manuals arrived at the battalion headquarters the following day.

A scheduled interruption of satellite service posed yet another multichannel TACSAT problem for the battalion to deal with. SPACECOM had planned for the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) II bird that normally provides Ground Mobile Force (GMF) TACSAT communications to the Pacific theater, to be taken out of service on 19 September, right in the middle of the expected main operations of TF-GI.

Upon the advice of McJunkin, the battalion quickly coordinated with MSG Randy Emery at the nearby Wheeler Army Air Field-based Regional Satellite Support Center (RSSC) to have the new DSCS III satellite brought on line by early 14 September, so continuous satellite support would be available for the entire relief operation.

Scales' initial analysis of the topography of the island of Kauai indicated that an MSE network deployed on Kauai would have to be split into a southern portion and a western portion, each with a node center. Because of a large, densely foliated hill mass in-between the two portions of the network, the only way CPT Mulqueen could plan to install an intra-island link between node centers was to use multichannel TACSAT. Mulqueen decided to deploy two multichannel TACSAT terminals to Kauai: one AN/TSC-85 and one AN/TSC-93. At the time, Mulqueen planned to us the AN/TSC-85 in a spoke configuration. The reason Mulqueen deployed it rather than an AN/TSC-93 was that the AN/TSC-85 automatically had a back up set of equipment.

The S3 then planned to shoot the second set of internodal links from the two Kauai node centers to Oahu via line-of-sight over the ocean through two Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) radio relays located atop Mount Kaala, the highest point on Oahu at a 1220 meter elevation. The distance of the two over-water

internodals would be 150 and 184 kilometers respectively. He also directed that C Company deploy an FM dual retrans team with the relays to Mount Kaala to provide retransmission of the TF-GI Command Net and the signal battalion engineering net.

At first glance, most seasoned signalers would say Mulqueen's plan was foolish considering the fact that the nominal LOS planning range for the MSE AN/GRC-226 radio is 25 kilometers. However, the terrain of the Hawaiian Islands had allowed the 125th Signal Battalion to complete a shot more than twice that distance in April '92 to the Pahakaloa Training Area (PTA) on the big island of Hawaii during the 1st Brigade Joint Readiness Training Center train-up exercise.

The battalion had installed a vertically polarized, Band I, 256 kbs internodal link from Mount Kaala to PTA over a distance of 260 kilometers! The battalion established the shot over a distance more than ten times the planning range of the radio and had enjoyed a 90-95% reliability rate! So the plan to put in two short links to Kauai caused no doubts in the mind of BG Akers.

The Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO), 1LT Jessica Smith, also had a concern: The battalion had submitted three HMMWVs carrying vital MSE Radio Access Units (RAUs) and a line-of-sight (LOS) radio van to the community Directorate of Logistics (DOL) for rustproofing, and the DOL personnel had locked the equipment in their Schofield Barracks facility for the weekend. Smith quickly contacted a DOL representative at the community EOC and coordinated the return of vehicles to the unit.

The battalion picked up the vehicles the following morning, which allowed the unit to prepare the equipment for deployment that same day. The BMO's action was vital to the success of the entire network, because before the operation was over, the battalion had subscriber requirements to place every RAU in service in the network.

CW2 Tim Kirkland, the battalion MSE Network Technician, anticipated the need for increased commercial telephone access for the Kauai network. He modified the network plan for the two Small Schofield Barracks, to include installation of three type V cards in each SEN rather than the usual one. Therefore, the two SENs could each provide Dial Central Office (DCO) access to six telephones lines (two lines per Type V card).

Since the SENs had only two binding posts on the exterior of the van, Kirkland directed the operators to connect a J-1077 junction box to each SEN, allowing them to tie in the additional DCO drops. Kirkland obtained the additional Type V cards by stripping them out of the SENs planned for deployment to Kauai where there weren't any operational phone lines. Two of the lines at 25ID(L) HQ were Defense Switched Network (DSN) lines to give worldwide access to the subscribers calling out of the MSE network.

The battalion also planned to install two public access DCO drops at a SEN located at HMR at the battalion headquarters building when Node Center (NC) 61 deployed. However, once Operation Iniki Response began, all of the DCO drops received such intense usage that Corns had difficulty accessing any of the drops. To rectify the problem, the battalion SYSCON rear directed that NC 61 deprogram the DCO drops from 5C (local subscriber) access off the SEN at the battalion HQ. SYSCON then gave the HMR DCO drop telephone numbers only to the Commanding General and his aide, so they would always have access to the network from a commercial telephone or access to a DCO line whenever they needed it.

On 12 September, Task Force Roberts, led by Alpha Company commander, CPT Charlie Roberts and 1SG Juan San Nicholas, began to deploy within four hours of notification. Company A MSE NC platoon 60 led by 2LT Becky Kanis and SFC Bill Truhitte, augmented with elements of 2LT Lucie Deile's newly-formed multichannel TACSAT platoon, deployed twenty miles to the Pearl Harbor docks for movement to Kauai on a commercial barge. By noon, Kanis had completed loading of her portion of the task force on the barge with other relief elements from the Garden Isle Task Force.

125 sig HMMWV passes Iniki devastation on Kauai



Figure 1

Meanwhile, the 25ID(L) TF-GI advance team found that it could not complete the Kauai damage assessment and relief coordination for the task force to arrive on Kauai that day, so the division G3 directed that the commercial barge equipment and personnel be disembarked and returned to their respective home bases. Kanis returned her convoy to the battalion motor pool at HMR, and made preparations for redeployment on short notice.

Late that same day, Hawaii state civil defense representatives and members of the Kauai government met to discuss what resources should be requested from the military to aid the relief effort. The State of Hawaii civil defense communications representative strongly advocated request of the MSE assets of the 125th Signal Battalion. The representative, MAJ (Ret.) George Burnette had been the 25ID(L) ADSO from 1987 to 1990 and fully understood the capabilities of the MSE system.

Back at HMR, while awaiting further instructions, the rest of the battalion's soldiers assisted with the cleanup of the reservation. The troops loaded and hauled away storm debris, restored the storm shelter to normal, and raked up common areas. By early afternoon, little evidence of the storm could be seen anywhere on HMR.

The TF-GI initial assessment of Kauai facilities completed late on 12 September confirmed that there were virtually no external or internal communications or power systems working on the island. Both TF-GI and civil agencies direly needed communications to conduct relief and recovery operations. With the requirement for federal assistance from TF-GI validated by the civil authorities, the battalion was rolling out again on the following morning; this time within only three hours of notification. On this second deployment, a two MSE platoon task force with multichannel TACSAT convoyed to Pearl Harbor to deploy on the USS Belleau Wood. The S3 added 2LT Marcus Reese and SFC Freddie Joyner's NC 63 platoon to the battalion assets deploying with Kanis' NC 60 platoon.

Concurrently, the deploying Signal battalion systems control (SYSCON) elements moved to Wheeler Army Air Field for CH-47 helicopter slingload to Kauai to conduct site reconnaissance and link-up with the platoons upon their arrival.

The elements consisted of the signal task force commander; CPT Roberts and his HMMWV, SYSCON forward personnel; LT Scales, CW2 Kirkland and their HMMWV, a Charlie Company SINCGARS FM dual retransmission station team and vehicle, and an LOS V(3) team and vehicle. Inclusion of the LOS V(3) would allow the radio shots for the first node center to be installed and hot as the node center switches arrived.

The two remaining node platoons of the battalion, NC 62 led by 2LT Mike Ganuelas and SFC Bobbie Smith, and NC 61 led by 2LT Mark Gaylo and SFC Rick Fetzer, quickly deployed to 25ID(L) HQ, at Schofield Barracks, and the battalion HQ at HMR respectively. CPT Mulqueen deployed the AN/TSC-85 multichannel TACSAT hub to the 25ID(L) HQ with NC 62. By noon, 13 September, the Oahu MSE network was hot and prepared to link with the battalion forward elements enroute to Kauai.

Later at Pearl Harbor, the USS Belleau Wood completed its loading of the two node center platoons, vehicles from the 325th T Forward Support Battalion, and various other elements from the JTF relief force, and cast off at 1800 hours sharp. The Belleau Wood loadmasters lashed many of the vehicles on the top deck of the ship next to its CH-46 cargo helicopter fleet to make room for the large number of vehicles deploying. The ship steamed the distance to Kauai in four hours, but upon arrival at 2200 hours, the ship's captain postponed debarkation of the cargo until first light. There was no power, the Nawiliwili harbor was dark, and there were doubts whether the harbor could be navigated safely.

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Three hours before the USS Belleau Wood's arrival, in the early evening of 13 September, the slingloaded Signal battalion forward SYSCON elements arrived on Kauai. From Lihue airport on Kauai, CW2 Kirkland made instantaneous FM communications from his vehicle's whip antenna through the Mount Kaala retrans to the MAJ Petersen, riding in his HMMWV on Oahu. The battalion had installed the FM command and control communications link over a 150 kilometer inter-island distance. The communications distance exceeded the nominal 35 kilometer planning range of the radios by over four times.

FM Command Net communication from the 25ID(L) EOC on Oahu to the TF-GI command post at Lihue was also quickly established through the SINCGARS retransmission station. Later, the battalion installed a second dual retransmission station which had arrived on the USS Belleau Wood, to extend the TF-GI Command net 50 kilometers further to the Barking Sands area on the far west side of Kauai.

On the morning of 14 September, the captain of the USS Belleau Wood decided to conduct a massive slingload operation to offload the two embarked MSE platoons into Lihue because the ship could not dock at the storm-ravaged harbor moorings. CH-46 and Jolly Green Giant helicopters began to slingload all vehicles off the Belleau Wood.

Within one hour of off-load, Kanis' NC 60, at the Lihue Airport on Kauai, was operational and tied into the MSE network on Oahu via a 1024 kbs, vertically polarized, Band I, LOS internodal link.

Because of the debris-clogged roads limiting deployment, the second node center, NC 63 did not activate until 24 hours later. NC 63 located near the town of Hanapepe and installed a 184 km shot as a 512 kbs, vertically-polarized, Band I, LOS link. NC 63 then put in a second internodal link. It was a 256 kbs internodal link via a multichannel TACSAT spoke configuration to the hub located on Oahu at NC 62.

On 15 September, the battalion deployed the last multichannel TACSAT spoke, an AN/TSC-93, via C-130 to NC 60 at Lihue. Once the battalion established the 256 kbs internodal link from NC 60 to NC 62 on 16 September, the MSE backbone network was complete.

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Late on 15 September, Mulqueen reevaluated the multichannel TACSAT system configuration and realized that if the internodal link between NC 62 and NC 61 failed, network connection between NC 60 and NC 63 on Kauai would be severed. The S3 then reconfigured the multichannel TACSAT plans for the network. NC 63, near Hanapepe an Kauai, became the hub for the two spokes at NC 60 in Lihue and NC 62 at Schofield Barracks, respectively.

The same day, the Signal battalion deployed fifteen Mobile Subscriber Radio Terminals (MSRTs) to Kauai via Army ship to provide additional communications assets to the civil authorities, emergency services, and military components participating in the Kauai relief effort. Hicks deployed to Kauai that morning by helicopter. Upon arrival, she began to personally manage the deployment of the MSRTs. One hospital to which she delivered an MSRT had been without communications for five days and needed a MEDEVAC for one of their patients. Hospital personnel were able to immediately use the MSRT to summon a MEDEVAC helicopter to evacuate the patient to Oahu.

Early on 16 September, the forward SYSCON completed the multichannel TACSAT system reconfiguration operation successfully. Concurrently, on Oahu, the battalion installed a link from NC 62 through a relay at Camp Smith to a Small Extension Node (SEN) located at the JTF headquarters at Fort Shafter.

The battalion then continued to deploy RAUs and SEN switchboards to Kauai via C-5s, C-130s, Army ships, Navy ships, and commercial barges to complete the C2 communications coverage around the 90 kilometer inhabited perimeter of Kauai. The battalion installed SENs to provide JTF

communications to the TF-GI HQ at the Division Tactical Command Post (DTCP), the 45th Support Group HQ, and the Hawaii National Guard HQ at Lihue, the Division Support Command (DISCOM), Aviation Brigade, and Marine Corps Task Force at Barking Sands, and 25ID(L) TF Warrior and 225th FSB located near Kapaa.

The battalion extended the MSE system around the island, finally completing the system on 17 September with the G73 SEN located in Princeville on the far north shore of Kauai. (Figure 1, page 21).

Examples of civil authorities and emergency services using the MSE communications included Kauai Mayor Yukimura, members of the county government and the state civil defense organization, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) representatives, seven fire stations, three police stations, four hospitals, five full service disaster relief centers, and the Army MEDEVAC helicopter. On 16 September, the Signal battalion deployed ten more MSRTs to Kauai to provide additional communications to the task force and civil authorities. In all, the battalion issued over 20 MSRTs and 25 DNVTs to emergency relief personnel and civil authorities.

Some RAU, SEN and relay teams provided much more than communications support. Operation of most MSE systems uses a very small percentage of the rated power of the MSE generators. One team discovered a refrigerator in the wreckage of a house and asked its owner if they could connect it to their generator power. The local townspeople then began to store their perishable foodstuffs and make ice in refrigerators and freezers hooked up to generators at signal sites. Still other teams assisted hurricane victims with their cleanup.

To meet the need for an electronic mail (e-mail) capability, the Signal Battalion provided its home-grown (Light) Maneuver Reporting System [(L)MRS] terminals at critical disaster relief nodes throughout the MSE system on Oahu and Kauai. The (L)MRS is a system conceived of by the previous signal battalion commander, LTC Ed Elkins. The system was designed and fielded by the Division Automation Management Officer (DAMO), MAJ Patrick Fahey. The battalion fielded (L)MARS locally to make up for the lack of a light division Maneuver Control System and to use the powerful capabilities of the MSE packet switching system to pass data and e-mail.

Fahey distributed (L)MARS terminals to all echelons of the JTF. During the relief effort, the data capability offered by (L)MARS was critical to passing and coordinating information for command and control, logistics, and movement control personnel within the Joint Task Force. To provide additional connectivity, Fahey successfully coordinated with USARPAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management (DCSIM) representatives to install a Defense Data Network (DDN) interface in the MSE system to allow the (L)MRS terminals to enter the local e-mail system as well as the world-wide military DDN system.

On 19 September, the NC 63 internodal link to the Mount Kaala relay began to have major problems. After several hours of trouble-shooting, NC 63 personnel realized that there had been a dormant power station positioned along the 6361 system line-of-sight when they first installed the system. The problem was that the power station was no longer dormant and its interference was simply too much to shoot over. SYSCON directed the installation of LOS relay Z67 near Puolo Point to route the system around the newly-activated power station.

As the TF-GI need for additional communications continued to build and the available air and sea sorties to deploy additional equipment to Kauai began to shrink, the forward SYSCON personnel had to use innovative techniques to install LOS shots for short distances. Kirkland directed the replacement of the Kilauea Bay AN/TRC-190 LOS V(3) relay with an LOS V(1) AN/TRC-190 equipped with a Super High



Figure 2

Frequency (SHF) radio to install the SEN shot down-the-hill to the Princeville SEN with SHF. He also planned for a similar configuration to install the shot into the G22 SEN in Nawiliwili Harbor. The result of modifying both systems was the gain of additional LOS (V)1 AN/TRC-190 assets. On 23 September, SYSCON used one to install a remote RAU at Kaapa to complete island-wide RAU coverage.

An example of what extraordinary steps the battalion took to insure 100% availability of communications occurred at Node Center 61, which was at HMR. The node center's RAU HMMWV had stripped its rear axle gears. Not knowing whether the RAU might be needed for deployment to Kauai later in the relief effort, the Battalion Maintenance Technician (BMT), CW2 Joe Cruz, arranged for the RAU to be fixed by a 725th Main Support Battalion repairman on-site while it was still on-the-air providing local MSRT coverage for Schofield Barracks. The battalion wrecker hoisted and held the RAU in the air, then the BMT placed blocks under the vehicle for added safety, and supervised the repair as the RAU remained suspended. The maintenance team completed the entire operation safely with absolutely no loss of MSRT coverage for the ongoing mission.

On 24 September, the safety of the island of Hawaii appeared to be threatened by a second storm, Hurricane Roslyn, as she closed on Hawaii's eastern coast. The 25ID(L) G3 directed the signal battalion to begin to plan and prepare to deploy its remaining uncommitted signal assets that consisted mainly of its MSE large extension node (LEN) and two AN/TSC-93 multichannel TACSAT terminals for a possible second relief effort. As Petersen and Assistant S3 1LT Susan Escallier began to plan a patchwork quilt of communications support consisting of what remained of the signal battalion linked to Air Force multichannel TACSAT terminals. However, the following morning, the Department of the Army passed the contingency mission for Hawaii island disaster relief communications support to a FORSCOM unit. The only communications requirement for the 125th Signal Battalion to support Hawaii island communications would be for fourteen single channel TACSATs.

Forty-eight hours later, Rosyln's wind speeds slowed her to a Tropical Storm designation as she veered northward away from Hawaii. The signal battalion wearily stood down from that diminishing eastern threat.

Meanwhile, the battalion continued to provide reliable communications coverage blanketing the island of Kauai until GTE restored minimum essential commercial lines to all critical service centers, civil and emergency headquarters. On 29 September, after GTE had restored the required commercial access capability on Kauai, Hicks received permission from BG Akers to begin an orderly shutdown of her network and was instructed to start redeployment.

By close of business, 1 October, the entire battalion had redeployed its soldiers and equipment by sea and air back to its HMR motor pool. During Operation Iniki Response, no vehicular accidents occurred on the island of Kauai in spite of the long hours served by the signal soldiers and the often treacherous road conditions.

Not only did the 125th Signal Battalion provide exceptional command and control communications support to the Joint Task Force and various disaster relief headquarters over unexpected distances with outstanding reliability, but for a time it had also provided the only accessible communications means to isolated hurricane victims trying to contact friends and family on Oahu.

During the entire operation, the 125th Signal Battalion had rapidly deployed 102 vehicles and 54 trailers by air and sea to Kauai, and over 35 vehicles and 20 trailers on Oahu; installed a multimedia signal network spanning over 200 kilometers on two islands, and completed over a quarter of a million telephone calls in support of Joint Task Force command and control and disaster relief headquarters requirements.

Notes:

Mainly for his efforts assisting with the installation of the Multichannel TACSAT during Iniki relief efforts, Wayne Raybon was recognized as 1992 CECOM Employee of the Year by MG Guenther, CECOM Commander.

The battalion Automation Management Officer, MAJ N. Patrick Fahey was recognized with the Bronze Order of Mercury for his (L)MRS computer system and outstanding automation support to the Division.

For its outstanding accomplishments while providing Iniki relief Signal support, the 125th Signal Battalion has been nominated by the USARPAC Commander for the Army Superior Unit Award. The award was pending when this article went to press.

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